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ABSTRACT
This paper is  structured in  accordance with identified components which are considered to  be  
essential  to  the  successful  implementation  of  the  (two fold)  topics  of  discussion  of  this  paper,  
namely,  monitoring  and  liquidity  risk  measurements.  The  importance  of  successfully  
communicating  results  obtained  from  monitoring  and  measuring  such  risks,  and  the  role  of  
corporate  governance  in  ensuring  such effective  communication,  constitutes  a  recurring  theme 
throughout  this  paper.  The  identified  components  are  as  follows:  i)  Corporate  governance  (ii)  
Internal  controls  (iii)  Disclosure  (iv)  Management  of  risk  (v)  Substance  over  form (vi)  
Transparency
As well as highlighting the interdependence of these components, the paper also aims to accentuate  
the importance of individual components. Whilst no hierarchy of importance is assigned to these  
components, corporate governance and internal controls are two components which are analysed 
in greater depth (than other components). Furthermore, corporate governance could be accorded a  
status of greater importance than internal controls having regard to the fact that whilst internal  
controls relate to a very vital control aspect of an organisation, corporate governance relates to all  
processes – be it decision making, control, production, performance, within a company/bank.
The paper will also attempt to demonstrate that it is possible to implement a system of regulation 
which  combines  increased  formalised  procedures  and/or  detailed  rules  -  whilst  giving  due 
consideration to the substance of transactions.
Key words: corporate governance; internal controls; monitoring; liquidity; regulation
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR LIQUIDITY RISK 
MEASUREMENT, STANDARDS AND MONITORING: CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND INTERNAL CONTROLS
Marianne Ojo1
A. Introduction
The Basel  Committee’s  recent  focus  is  reflected  through its  goals  of  not  only intensifying  the 
“resilience of internationally active banks to liquidity stresses”, but also intensifying international 
harmonisation of liquidity risk supervision. These efforts are aimed at consolidating recent work 
which  culminated  in  the  issue  of  the  Principles  for  Sound  Liquidity  Risk  Management  and 
Supervision.2
As part of measures aimed at facilitating “further consolidation and promotion of consistency in 
international  liquidity  risk  supervision”,  and  in  response  to  the  “inaccurate  and  ineffective 
management of liquidity risk” – such ineffective management being a prominent feature of the 
financial crisis, the Basel Committee has developed a minimum set of monitoring tools to be used 
in  the  “ongoing  monitoring  of  the  liquidity  risk  exposures  of  cross  border  institutions  and  in 
communicating these exposures amongst home and host supervisors.”3
This  paper  is  structured  in  accordance  with  identified  components  which  are  considered  to  be 
essential  to  the  successful  implementation  of  the  (two fold)  topics  of  discussion of  this  paper, 
namely,  monitoring  and  liquidity  risk  measurements.  The  importance  of  successfully 
communicating  results  obtained  from  monitoring  and  measuring  such  risks,  and  the  role  of 
corporate  governance  in  ensuring  such  effective  communication,  constitutes  a  recurring  theme 
throughout  this  paper.  The  identified  components  are  as  follows:  i)  Corporate  governance  (ii) 
Internal controls (iii) Disclosure (iv) Management of risk (v) Substance over form (vi) Transparency
Disclosure  and  transparency  embody  the  same  goals,  whilst  the  effective  management  and 
measurement of risks, and liquidity risks in particular, are aims which the internal control function 
and management should strive to achieve.  The theme “substance over form” draws attention to 
creative accounting practices  and the need for greater  emphasis  on principles  based regulation. 
Creative accounting and “window dressing” of figures in the financial statements are ever recurring 
issues arising from corporate collapses – as also recently highlighted by the recent crises which 
involved Lehman Brothers.
Whilst the danger of formalism lies in the exercise of “creative compliance”,4 inherent problems of 
anti formalism are considered to include:5
- The fact  that  citizens  have  the  right  to  know exactly  what  is  prohibited  in  advance  of 
behaviour rather than in retrospect
1 Researcher, Center for European Law and Politics (ZERP), University of Bremen and Teaching Associate, Oxford 
Brookes University, Oxford.
2 See Consultative Document „International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring 
at page 2
3 ibid
4 Creative compliance being the use of rules to escape control without actually violating those rules
5 V Beattie, S Fearnley and R Brandt Behind Closed Doors: What Company Audit is Really About 
(ICAEW) 2001 at page 11
- That broad rules are imprecise and over inclusive
- That anti formalism could result in ineffective control - where it is impossible to implement
Principles based regulation (PBR) is more advantageous than a rules based approach – owing to the 
fact that off balance6 sheet debt could result from the direct application of rules – without being able 
to consider the substance of the transaction and because the implemented standards do not allow 
such consideration. As its secondary argument7, this paper will seek to demonstrate that detailed 
rules  could  still  operate  within  a  system  of  principles  based  regulation  –  whilst  enabling  a 
consideration of the substance of the transactions which are involved.
Regulatory standards implemented by the Basel  Committee in its  recent  document8 provide for 
“jurisdiction-specific  conditions”  –  for  example,  the  percentage  of  potential  run-off  of  retail 
deposits which is partially dependent on the structure of a jurisdiction’s deposit insurance scheme.”9 
Furthermore, the Committee highlights that “in these cases, the parameters should be transparent 
and clearly outlined in the regulations of each jurisdiction.”10 It also adds that this would provide 
clarity both within the jurisdiction as well as across borders concerning the precise parameters that 
the banks are capturing in these metrics, and that there was need for public disclosures in respect of 
regulatory standards.11
Good corporate governance would “provide proper incentives for the board and management to 
pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company and its shareholders.”12 The dual faceted 
aspects  of  corporate  governance  relate  not  only  to  the  accountability  of  management  to 
shareholders,  but  also  to  the  supervision  and  monitoring  of  management  performance.  Good 
corporate  governance  should  facilitate  effective  monitoring,  effective  management  of  internal 
controls and risks, effective disclosure and transparency.
In considering the topics of discussion, namely, liquidity risk measurements and monitoring, this 
paper will commence with a section dedicated to liquidity risk (and risk measurements), along with 
developments which have triggered the need for particular monitoring tools  - both in response to 
global developments and with particular reference to the increasing prominence of liquidity risks.
The ever growing prominence and importance of liquidity in prudential supervision constitutes a 
vital reason which justifies the need for a prudential supervisory framework which does not merely 
(and excessively) rely on capital adequacy requirements within such a framework.
Some arguments which revolve around the inadequacies of capital adequacy standards include:13 the 
fact that:
- “Capital  ratios  may be  of  limited  value  as  indicators  of  actual  risk  since  reported  capital 
positions do not reflect the real causes of most bank failures ( the real causes of bank failures 
being fraud or fast depletion of the banks’ resources)
6 Off balance sheet items are obligations which are contingent liabilities of a company/bank – and which as a result, 
do not appear on its balance sheet. Formal distinction between on and off balance sheet items, even though 
sometimes detailed, depend to an extent on the degree of judgement which is exercised by management.
7  The primary theme being the importance of successfully communicating results obtained from monitoring and 
measuring such risks, and the role of corporate governance in ensuring such effective communication.
8   See Consultative Document, „International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and 
Monitoring“ at page 2
9  ibid
10  ibid
11  ibid
12  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision “Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organisations” 
February 2006 at page 4
13  C Hadjiemmanuil, Banking Regulation and the Bank of England Lloyds of London Press 1995 at page 210
- The international minimum ration of 8% lacks any theoretical justification
- Risk related measurement of bank assets is not only deeply flawed, but also triggers substantial 
distortions in the relative demand for bank assets.
- Since banks are in direct competition with investment firms, so far as securities activities are 
concerned, the imposition of capital burdens on banks erodes their ability to compete.”
Paragraph 56 of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk 
Management and Supervision states that 
“A bank should have a reliable management information system designed to provide the board of 
directors,  senior  management  and other  appropriate  personnel  with timely and forward-looking 
information on the liquidity position of the bank. The management information system should have 
the  ability  to  calculate  liquidity  positions  in  all  of  the  currencies  in  which  the  bank conducts 
business – both on a subsidiary/branch basis in all jurisdictions in which the bank is active and on 
an aggregate group basis. It should capture all sources of liquidity risk, including contingent risks 
and the related triggers and those arising from new activities, and have the ability to deliver more 
granular and time sensitive information during stress events. To effectively manage and monitor its 
net  funding requirements,  a  bank should have the ability to  calculate  liquidity positions  on an 
intraday basis, on a day-to-day basis for the shorter time horizons, and over a series of more distant 
time periods thereafter. The management information system should be used in day-to-day liquidity 
risk  management  to  monitor  compliance  with  the  bank’s  established  policies,  procedures  and 
limits.”14
B. Liquidity Risks
In February 2008, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published a paper titled “Liquidity 
Risk Management and Supervisory Challenges”, a paper which highlighted the fact that many banks 
had ignored the application of a number of basic principles of liquidity risk management during 
periods of abundant liquidity.15 An extensive review of its 2000 “Sound Practices for Managing 
Liquidity in Banking Organisations” was also carried out by the Basel Committee as a means of 
addressing matters and issues arising from the financial markets and lessons from the Financial 
Crises.16 In order to consolidate on the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision’s Principles for 
Sound  Liquidity  Risk  Management  and  Supervision  of  September  2008,  which  should  lead  to 
improved management and supervision of liquidity risks of individual banks, supervisory bodies 
will be required “ to develop tools and policies to address the pro cyclical behaviour of liquidity at 
the aggregate level.17
14 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision  Sept 
2008 at page 17 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm> Furthermore, paragraph 57 highlights the importance of a 
consensus between senior management in relation to a set of reporting criteria aimed at facilitating liquidity risk 
monitoring. Such reporting criteria should specify ““the scope, manner and frequency of reporting for various recipients 
(such as the board, senior management, asset – liability committee) and the parties responsible for preparing the 
reports.” “Reporting of risk measures should be done on a frequent basis (eg daily reporting for those responsible for 
managing liquidity risk, and at each board meeting during normal times, with reporting increasing in times of stress) 
and should compare current liquidity exposures to established limits to identify any emerging pressures and limit 
breaches. Breaches in liquidity risk limits should be reported and thresholds and reporting guidelines should be 
specified for escalation to higher levels of management, the board and supervisory authorities.” 
15 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision  Sept 
2008 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm>
16  ibid
17  “The FSF proposes that the BCBS and CGFS develop a joint research effort to address funding and liquidity risk, 
The Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision of September 2008 are aimed 
at providing “consistent supervisory expectations” on principal elements such as “board and senior 
management oversight; the establishment of policies and risk tolerance; the use of liquidity risk 
management tools such as comprehensive cash flow forecasting, limits and liquidity scenario stress 
testing;  and  the  maintenance  of  a  sufficient  cushion  of  high  quality  liquid  assets  to  address 
contingent liquidity needs.”18
The  three  aspects  to  pro  cyclicality19 –  as  highlighted  in  the  Impact  Assessment  Document 
amending the Capital Requirements Directive, have the potential to trigger a chain reaction. Starting 
with remuneration schemes, the impact of these on management incentives, could have a positive or 
negative effect on bank regulations (such as Basel II or the CRD). Such regulations could then 
mitigate or exacerbate pro cyclical effects – depending on the effectiveness of capital adequacy 
rules. A positive effect of such rules would reduce the tendency of banks to cut back on lending 
during economic “busts” whilst incentives to retain liquidity would be increased – hence reducing 
the likelihood of the occurrence of maturity mismatches.
The link between liquidity and systemic risks as illustrated in the ECB’s Financial Stability Review, 
is attributed to the “destruction of specific knowledge20 which banks have about their borrowers and 
the reduction of the common pool of liquidity.”21 The importance of the link between liquidity risks 
and systemic risks within the banking sector is highlighted by the consequences attributed to the 
reluctance of banks to retain liquidity - given the cost  of holding liquidity.22 The consequential 
shortfalls of liquidity as reflected by on and off balance sheet maturity mismatches accentuates the 
importance of the role assumed by central banks in the funding of bank balance sheets.23
The link between liquidity and systemic risks is also accentuated under paragraph 77 of the BCBS 
Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision of September 2008. Principle 8 
states that:
“A bank should actively manage its intraday liquidity positions and risks to meet payment and 
settlement  obligations  on  a  timely  basis  under  both  normal  and  stressed  conditions  and  thus 
contribute to the smooth functioning of payment and settlement systems.”
Paragraph 7724 elaborates on this by highlighting the reasons why “intraday liquidity management” 
constitutes an important component of a bank’s “broader liquidity management strategy.” It goes on 
starting in 2009. A key component of this research agenda is to define robust measures of funding and liquidity risk, 
which could assist assessments of liquidity risk by the private sector. Stress tests to gauge the probability and 
magnitude of a liquidity crisis in different market environments will be considered in this light.” For further 
information on this, see Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial 
System: Measuring and Funding Liquidity Risk” http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf at 
page 24
18  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document “International Framework for Liquidity 
Risk, Measurement Standards and Monitoring” Bank for International Settlements  Publications at page 1
19 Namely: systemic aspects, bank regulations and remuneration policies
20Since specific knowledge which banks possess about their borrowers is considered to be a factor which determines the 
illiquidity of bank loans; see “The Concept of Systemic Risk” ECB Financial Stability Review December 2009 at page 
137<http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/shared/pdf/ivbfinancialstabilityreview200912en.pdf?05d3164914c6a14bb13522
2b5c3894fa>
21ibid; According to the Review, the reduction in the common pool of liquidity also has the potential to trigger the failure of 
banks and could consequently lead to a devaluation of illiquid bank assets and further aggravation of problems within the 
banking sector.
22Report of the Financial Stability Forum on “Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: Measuring and Funding 
Liquidity Risk” http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf at page 24
23 ibid
24Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision  Sept 2008 at pages 20 and 21
to state that a bank’s failure to manage intraday liquidity effectively could result in its inability to 
meet payment obligations as they fall due, - hence generating consequences, not only for its own 
liquidity position, but also that of other parties. It illustrates how this could occur in two ways, 
namely: 
- “The fact that that counter parties may view the failure to settle payments when expected, as a 
sign of financial weakness – which in turn could result not only in payments to the bank being 
delayed or withheld, but also in further aggravation of liquidity pressures.
- It  also could leave counterparties unexpectedly short  of funds,  impair  those counterparties’ 
ability  to  meet  payment  obligations,  and  disrupt  the  smooth  functioning  of  payment  and 
settlement systems. Given the interdependencies that exist among systems, a bank’s failure to 
meet certain critical payments could lead to liquidity dislocations that cascade quickly across 
many systems and institutions. If risk controls are overwhelmed, these dislocations could alter 
many banks’ intraday or overnight funding needs, including their demands for central bank 
credit,  and  potentially  affect  conditions  in  money markets.  The  delay of  other  less  critical 
payments  also might  cause other  institutions  to  postpone  their  own payments,  cause  many 
banks to face increased uncertainty about their overnight funding needs and potentially increase 
the impact of any operational outages.”
Liquidity is considered to be “highly procyclical, growing in good times and drying up in times of 
stress.”25 During the build up to the present crisis,  banks and other financial institutions had an 
incentive to minimise the cost of holding liquidity.26 Given the fact that liquidity could also be pro 
cyclical and given its role in the recent crisis, perhaps four dimensions to pro cyclicality should 
have been introduced in the Impact Assessment Document27 amending the Capital Requirements 
Directive – incorporating liquidity as a fourth heading.
The growing importance of formalisation within the bank regulatory framework is also attributed to 
the gaps which exist within a discretionary based system of bank supervision – as was revealed in 
the aftermath of Baring Plc’s collapse. The recent crisis has also highlighted the need for formal risk 
assessment models – as demonstrated by the demise of Lehman Brothers where the failures of 
auditors to detect balance sheet irregularities (owing to  creative accounting practices) was brought 
to light.
The formal framework for the measurement of capital adequacy at European Community level, as 
exemplified  by  the  International  Convergence  of  Capital  Measurements  and  Capital 
Standards(Revised Framework), namely Basel 2, is to be commended, not only because of “the 
need  for  a  consistent  framework  for  the  reporting  and  comparative  analysis  of  bank  capital 
positions, the demand of regulated institutions for transparency and equality in the application of 
regulatory standards”, but also because of “the exigencies of the international convergence process 
– which requires the transparent and uniform implementation of harmonised rules by the regulators 
of every country.”28
25See Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System “Measuring and Funding 
Liquidity Risk” at page 24
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf
26 ibid
27 See Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration policies.< 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf> See page 44-46
28  See C Hadjiemmanuil, Banking Regulation and the Bank of England Lloyds of London Press 1995 at pages 208-
209
As part of measures aimed at consolidating and “promoting consistency in international liquidity 
risk supervision”, and in response to the “inaccurate and ineffective management of liquidity risk” – 
as  was  prominently  highlighted  during  the  recent  financial  crisis,  the  Basel  Committee  has 
developed a “minimum set of monitoring tools to be used in the ongoing monitoring of the liquidity 
risk exposures of cross border institutions and in communicating these exposures amongst home 
and host supervisors.”29
The Liquidity Coverage Ratio30 and the Net Stable Funding Ratio31 are two regulatory standards for 
liquidity  risk  which  serve  the  purpose  of  attaining  the  objectives  of  “promoting  short-term 
resiliency of the liquidity risk profile of institutions” (by ensuring that they have adequate high 
quality liquid resources to survive during periods of extreme stress which last for about one month) 
and “promoting resiliency over longer-term periods” ( through the creation of additional incentives 
for banks to fund their activities with more stable sources of funding on an ongoing basis).32
In addition to the above-mentioned standards, the Basel Committee recommends that supervisors 
also implement designated monitoring tools on a consistent basis. Such monitoring tools, along with 
the  standards,  are  intended  to  provide  supervisors  with  information  which  should  aid  their 
assessment  of  liquidity  risks  attributed  to  a  particular  bank.33 These  monitoring  tools  include: 
Contractual Maturity Mismatch, Concentration of Funding,  Available Unencumbered Assets and 
market – related monitoring tools.34
C. Disclosure 
As well as the need for greater focus on liquidity risk, there is also the need for greater reliance on 
disclosure requirements. This will be facilitated through an effective monitoring process whereby 
identified risks are effectively communicated across all levels of management.
Enhanced  transparency does  not  only  have  the  potential  to  “improve  an  understanding  of  the 
mechanism at play in structured finance”, but also facilitate the identification of risks and ensure 
that  risks  are  well  controlled.  35 Risky loans  which  were  “repackaged and sold  to  institutional 
investors” – some of whom did not fully comprehend the implications of the transactions they were 
engaged in (or about to be engaged in), and the inherent risks associated with those transactions, are 
considered to be contributory factors to the 2007/09 Financial Crisis.36
Regulators will be able to gain greater access to vital information which is required for effective 
performance of their functions where duties are imposed on third parties, such as external auditors, 
in  relation  to  the  disclosure  of  information  which  is  necessary  and  required  for  the  efficient 
performance of the regulators’ activities – as opposed to a right to report.
29  See Bank for International Settlements, Consultative Document “International Framework for Liquidity Risk, 
Measurement Standards and Monitoring” at page 2
30  This ratio „identifies the amount of unencumbered, high quality liquid assets an institution holds that can be used to 
offset the net cash outflows it would encounter under an acute short-term stress scenario by supervisors.“ ibid at 
page 3
31  This ratio measures “the amount of longer-term, stable sources of funding utilised by an institution relative to the 
liquidity profiles of the assets being funded and the potential for contingent calls on funding liquidity arising from 
off-balance sheet commitments and obligations.“ ibid
32  ibid
33  ibid at page 25
34  ibid
35  See speech by C McCreevy European Commissioner for Internal Market an Services at the European Parliament 11 
Sept 2007 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=SPEECH/07/520&format=HTML&aged=l&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
36  ibid
The relationship between supervisory authorities and the external auditors of a credit institution and 
the duties of these auditors was identified as an important lesson from the BCCI case.37 Because of 
auditors’ access to financial undertakings’ accounts and other essential documents and information, 
they assume a vital position in the overall supervisory process. An analysis of BCCI revealed that 
measures, additional to those already existing, needed to be taken to eliminate the opaqueness of 
financial  structures  and  strengthen  cooperation  between  all  bodies  or  persons  involved  in  the 
supervision of such complex financial structures.38
As a result, the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision issued “minimum standards” which lay 
down rules for effective consolidated supervision and cooperation between supervisory authorities. 
This was not only aimed at strengthening international co operation between prudential supervisors, 
but also to improve transparency of financial, and in particular, group structures.
D. The Importance of Effective Management of Internal Controls
“Banks identified as having control problems have been characterised by organisational structures 
in which responsibilities were not clearly defined: hence (1) No senior management monitored the 
performance of activities (carried out within the organisation) closely to observe unusual activities 
2) No senior management had a comprehensive understanding of the activities and how profits were 
being generated.”39
The collapse of Barings in1995 which was attributed not only to lack of quality and employee 
deception, also brought the issue of internal controls and management systems to the fore.40 Barings 
collapse illustrated weaknesses in the bank regulator’s supervisory regime - which included flaws 
within its evaluation of internal controls at banks, flaws inherent in the internal communication 
within  levels  of  management  of  the  bank  regulator,  and  the  weaknesses  in  the  way the  bank 
regulator’s existing rules were applied.41
 The  Basel  Committee  categorised  into  five  groups,  types  of  control  breakdowns  which  are 
characteristic of ailing banks and these are as follows:42 
- Lack of adequate management oversight and accountability, and failure to develop a strong 
control culture within the bank43
37  JF Mogg, ‚The Bank of England and the Development of Internal Control Systems’ in R Kinsella (ed) Internal 
Controls in Banking (Oak Tree Press Dublin 1995) at page 31
38  ibid at page 28
39  See “Framework for Internal Control Systems in Banking Organisations”, Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision 1998 at page 27
40  Whilst it is contended by some that the problems attributed to Barings focussed round the lack of controls, the 
system of internal controls which operated were also considered by the regulator at the time (the Bank of England) 
to be informal but effective. See Barings Bank and International Regulation Volume 1 (12 December 1006) at page 
xiii
41  See Treasury Committee, Barings Bank and International Regulation Report No 1 1996 page xv
42  See Framework for Internal Control Systems in Banking Organisations, Basel Committee for Banking Supervision 
1998 at pages 6 and 7
43  In order to evaluate the quality of internal controls, supervisors could adopt a number of approaches which include 
i) the evaluation of the work of the internal audit department of the bank (though review of its working papers – 
including the methodology implemented in identifying, measuring, monitoring and controlling risks). ii) If 
supervisors are satisfied with the quality of the internal audit department’s work, they could use the reports of 
internal auditors as a primary mechanism for the identification of control problems in the bank (or for identifying 
areas of potential risk – areas which have not been recently reviewed by the auditors). iii)Further some supervisors 
may use a self-assessment process in which management reviews the internal controls on a business by business 
basis whilst  iv)other supervisors may require periodic external audits of key areas (given that supervisor defines the 
- Inadequate recognition and assessment of the risk of certain banking activities, whether on or 
off balance sheet
- The absence or failure of key control structures and activities such as segregation of duties, 
approvals, verifications, reconciliations and reviews of operating performance
- Inadequate communication of information between levels of management within the bank – 
particularly the communication of information to higher ranked officials (senior management)
- Inadequate or ineffective audit programmes and monitoring activities
E. The Contribution of Corporate Governance to an Effective System of Internal Controls
Various corporate collapses have resulted in changes to financial reporting, corporate governance 
and audit.44 The emphasis on internal controls and risk management emerged from realisation that 
due  to  change  in  the  business  environment,  even  effective  safeguards  may  be  insufficient  to 
eliminate all possibilities of failure.45
Keasy and Wright define corporate governance as the “examination of the structures and processes 
associated with production, decision making, control and so on within an organisation.”46 The two 
aspects  of  governance  are  considered  to  be  i)  Supervision  and  monitoring  of  management 
performance (the enterprise aspect) and ii) ensuring accountability of management to shareholders 
and other stakeholders (the accountability aspect).47
The feedback effects of corporate governance into the liquidity and systemic risk mechanisms are 
illustrated thus: 
“Poor corporate governance may contribute to bank failures, which could pose significant public 
costs and consequences due to their potential impact on any applicable deposit insurance systems 
and the possibility of broader macro economic implications, such as contagion risk and impact on 
payments  systems.  Furthermore,  poor  corporate  governance  could  result  in  markets  losing 
confidence in the ability of a bank to properly manage its assets and liabilities, including deposits, 
which could in turn, trigger a bank run or liquidity crisis.”48
As well  as a robust system of  internal  controls  (which incorporates  internal  and external  audit 
functions), the implementation of i) corporate values, codes of conduct, standards of appropriate 
behaviour  and  the  system  used  in  ensuring  compliance  with  these,  ii)  a  clear  allocation  of 
responsibilities and decision making authorities, iii)  the establishment of a system which would 
guarantee efficient interaction and collaboration between the board of directors, senior management 
and auditors, and iv) special monitoring of risk exposures where conflicts of interest are likely to be 
high, are considered to be crucial to ensuring that sound corporate governance operates within an 
scope). Supervisors may ultimately combine one or more of the techniques highlighted under (i) - (iv) with own on 
site reviews or examinations of internal controls. See ibid at pages 22 and 23
44  House of Commons Select Committee on Treasury, Minutes of Evidence submitted by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales as part of its inquiry into the arrangements for financial regulation of public 
limited companies at page 17
45  ibid
46  See K Keasy and M Wright, ‘Issues in Corporate Accountability and Governance: An Editorial’ Accounting and 
Business Research, 23 (91A) at page 291. OECD principles define corporate governance as involving “ a set of 
relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders, and other stakeholders.”
47  V Beattie, S Fearnley and R Brandt Behind Closed Doors: What Company Audit is Really About (ICAEW) 2001 at 
page 26
48  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision “Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organisations” 
February 2006 at page 4
organisation.49
Furthermore,  sound corporate  governance practices  are  considered to  require  “  appropriate  and 
effective legal, regulatory and institutional foundations.”50 Even though factors such as the system 
of business laws and accounting standards which prevail in respective jurisdictions are considered 
to  be  factors  which  operate  beyond  the  scope  of  banking  supervision,  the  inclusion  of  four 
important forms of oversight are considered sufficient not only in ensuring that appropriate checks 
and balances exist,  but that an effective system of corporate governance can be achieved.51 The 
types of oversight include: 
“(1)  oversight  by the board of  directors  or  supervisory board;  (2)  oversight  by individuals  not 
involved in the day-to-day running of the various  business areas;  (3) direct  line supervision of 
different business areas; and (4) independent risk management, compliance and audit functions. In 
addition, it is important that key personnel are fit and proper for their jobs. “52
The contribution  and the  role  assumed by senior  management  in  ensuring that  internal  control 
systems are effectively managed, is reflected through the Principles for the Assessment of Internal 
Control  Systems.53 The  importance  of  monitoring  and  the  rectification  of  deficiencies  within 
internal control systems is reflected under principles 10-12.54 Principle 10 highlights the importance 
of monitoring on a frequent and ongoing basis whilst principles 11 and 12 draw attention to the 
importance of effective collaboration and communication between highly trained competent staff, 
the board of directors, audit committees and senior management.55
According to paragraph 84 of the BCBS Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and
Supervision of September 2008, internal coordination across business lines is vital towards ensuring 
that effective controls over liquidity outflows are achieved.56 In relation to examples of actions 
which supervisors could adopt , as means of responding to banks with liquidity risk management 
weaknesses or excessive liquidity risk, that which “requires actions by the bank to strengthen its 
management of liquidity risk through improvements in internal policies, controls or reporting to 
senior  management  and  the  board”  is  considered  to  have  the  greatest  potential  to  address 
deficiencies in a bank’s liquidity risk management process or liquidity position.57
As observed by the Basel Committee,58 “most banks that have experienced losses from internal 
control problems did not effectively monitor their internal control systems. Often the systems did 
not  have  the  necessary  built-in  ongoing  monitoring  processes  and  the  separate  evaluations 
performed  were  either  not  adequate  or  were  not  acted  upon  appropriately  by  management.”59 
Furthermore it  highlights that  such failures to monitor adequately commence with a “failure to 
49  Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, “ Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organisations” 2006 at 
page 4
50 ibid at page 5
51  ibid
52  ibid
53  See particularly Principles 1-3 which relate to management oversight and the control culture; ibid at pages 2 and 3
54  ibid at page 4
55  ibid at pages 4 and 5
56 Paragraph 16, as well as other sections which address and relate to internal and risk controls in particular, are 
considered to have the greatest importance out of all the sections within the BCBS Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk 
Management and Supervision of September 2008
57 See paragraph 142 of BCBS Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision of September 2008
58  See “Monitoring Activities and Correcting Deficiencies” Framework for Internal Controls in Banking 
Organisations, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1998 at page 30
59  See ibid at paragraph 10
consider and react  to day-to-day information provided to line management and other personnel 
indicating unusual activity – such as exceeded exposure limits, customer accounts in proprietary 
business activities or lack of current financial statements from borrowers.”60
In implementing the regulatory standards and monitoring tools which are highlighted by the Basel 
Committee in its consultative document,61 a supervisory approach which does not only incorporate 
the  expertise  of  external  auditors,  but  which  is  also  more  inclined  to  an on site  system based 
approach is recommended. In supporting this view, reference is made to lessons learned from the 
collapse  of  Barings  where  it  was  noted  by  the  Treasury  Committee  that  “it  was  due  to  the 
discretionary basis  of  the supervisor’s  approach to  supervision that  there  was limited ability to 
detect events at Barings.”62
The regulatory standards  and monitoring tools  set  out  in  the  BIS Consultative  Document63 are 
therefore supported on the basis of their ability to facilitate a more formal approach to supervision 
which would reduce the scope for flexibility (scope for creative accounting practices and “window 
dressing” of balance sheet figures) where an on – site approach to supervision is implemented.
F. On site and Off-site Supervision
Principle 21 of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Supervision, Supervisory Reporting states 
that  “Supervisors must have a means of collecting, reviewing and analysing prudential reports and 
statistical returns from banks on both a solo and a consolidated basis, and a means of independent 
verification of these reports, through either on-site examinations or use of external experts.”
According to Vieten64 bank regulation has followed two trends, namely: supervision has become 
increasingly formalized and dependent on quantitative tools, and secondly, regulatory duties are 
being pushed down a regulatory pyramid to include external auditors and to enlist the resources of 
regulatees.
External auditors, even though they do not constitute by definition, part of a banking organisation, 
immensely  impact  the  quality  of  internal  controls  “through  their  audit  activities  –  which  also 
includes  discussions  with  management  and  recommendations  for  improvement  to  internal 
controls.”65 “External auditors provide an important feedback on the effectiveness of the internal 
control system.”66
Off site supervision is synonymous with monitoring and involves the regulator’s use of external 
auditors’ expertise. It also involves the receipt and analysis of financial statements and statistical 
returns submitted to the supervisors. Off site monitoring often has the benefits of being able to 
identify  potential  problems,  particularly  during  intervals  between  on-  site  inspections,  thereby 
providing early detection and acting as trigger for corrective action before problems become more 
60  See ibid at paragraph 11
61  See Consultative Document ‚International Framework For Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring 
December 2009
62  Treasury Committee Barings Bank and International Regulation Report No 1 (1996) at page xiv
63  Consultative Document ‚International Framework For Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring 
December 2009
64  See HR Vieten, „Banking Regulation in Britain and Germany Compared: Capital Ratios, External Audit and 
Internal Controls“ (1997) at page 18
65  Framework for Internal Control Systems in Banking Organisations, page 25 Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision 1998
66  ibid
serious.67
On  site  work  is  usually  done  by  the  examination  staff  of  the  bank  supervisory  agency  or 
commissioned  by  supervisors  but  may  be  undertaken  by  external  auditors.  Furthermore,  it  is 
contended that on-site examinations are frequently implemented by banking supervisory authorities 
which posses the legal basis or other arrangements to direct the scope of the work carried out by 
external auditors.68
Ongoing monitoring is contrasted with separate evaluations. It is highlighted that whilst ongoing 
monitoring  activities  not  only  provide  the  advantage  of  “quickly  detecting  and  correcting 
deficiencies in the system”, but are also most effective “when the system of internal control is 
integrated into the operating environment and produces regular reports for review,” that separate 
evaluations usually detect problems “only after the fact.”69 However separate evaluations also offer 
the  advantage  of  providing  an  organisation  with  “fresh  and  comprehensive”  insight  into  the 
effectiveness of monitoring activities  –  such activities  being undertaken by staff  from different 
departments which include the business function, financial control and internal audit.70
G. Monitoring Compliance and Enforcement
Principles Based Regulation
A discretionary based approach to regulation, whilst encouraging greater possibilities for regulatory 
capture, appears to be more congruent with principles based regulation. However it is possible to 
implement a system of regulation which combines increased formalised procedures and/or detailed 
rules - whilst giving due consideration to the substance of transactions.
“Principles provide the framework in which firms can organize their own processes to achieve the 
outcomes the regulator seeks – the regulator in turn, depends on firms to adopt an attitude to the 
regulatory regime (which is one which aims to go beyond minimal compliance with rules).”71
Principles based regulation is not only advantageous because it allows management of a bank or 
firm  to  take  into  consideration  the  substance  of  transactions,  but  because  “principles  impose 
outcomes to be achieved – not detailed processes for achieving them.”72 As well as being linked to 
meta regulation, principles based regulation facilitates a system whereby principles “communicate 
regulatory objectives and promote behaviour which will achieve those objectives.”73
Principles based regulation, thus, would not only reduce the scope for “creative compliance” – since 
the substance of transactions should be considered by management,  but also has the benefit  of 
providing a more flexible and responsive approach to regulation as the subsequent section will seek 
to demonstrate.
67  See „The Relationship between Banking Supervisors and Banks’ External Auditors January 2002 paragraph 40 page 
11 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs87.pdf?noframes=1>
68  See Framework for Internal Control Systems in Banking Organisations, Basel Committee for Banking Supervision 
1998 at page 23
69  ibid at page 20. 
70  ibid
71   See J Black, „Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation“ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Papers 13/2008 (2008) at page 9 http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/wps.htm  and 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstarct=1267722
72  ibid 
73  ibid at page 16
Principles based regulation is considered to comprise of 3 elements, namely:74
i) A particular type of rule
ii) A focus on outcomes and
iii) A focus on senior management responsibility in ensuring these outcomes are achieved
Furthermore,  three  forms  of  principles  based  regulation,  namely:  “formal  principles  based 
regulation; substantive principles based regulation and full principles based regulation”, have been 
suggested.75 For the purposes of this paper, focus will be restricted to substantive principles based 
regulation.
- Five classes of regulatory practices which could characterise substantive principles based 
regulation  include:76 “The  particular  mode  of  interpretation-  that  is,  the  approach  taken  in  the 
interpretative  process;  particular  enforcement  style;  an  orientation  to  outcomes;  a  relocation  of 
responsibilities  for  working out  the practical  application of  the  provisions;  and an  explicit  and 
developed reliance on management based regulation.”
The effectiveness of rules and regulation is dependent, not only on the monitoring processes and 
tools used in such processes, but also the effectiveness of the enforcement of those rules. For this 
reason,  focus  will  be  dedicated  to  the  second  characteristic  of  substantive  principles  based 
regulation– which is indeed a “critical” and defining feature of principles based regulation.
According to Black, the adoption of the “responsive” enforcement approach is justified on the basis 
that “neither negotiative approaches nor deterrence based approaches are effective on their own and 
that instead, regulators should implement a mixture of both, that is, first negotiate, then if the firm 
still does not deliver substantive compliance, regulators should gradually move up the enforcement 
pyramid, applying sanctions of increasing severity until it does.”77 She adds weight to  Baldwin’s 
argument78 by stating that “those who know what they are meant to be doing and are generally 
inclined to do it (“the well intentioned and well informed”) , are best dealt with using a negotiating 
strategy – which is easier to do using principles. In contrast, those who do not know what they are 
meant to be doing and even if they did, would not be inclined to do it (“the ill intentioned and ill 
informed”),  are  best  dealt  with  using  a  strategy  that  escalates  rapidly  up  the  enforcement 
pyramid.”79
This “responsive” approach, it is further argued, “is not contingent on any particular rule design and 
can operate in systems of i) highly detailed rules,  ii)  where the rules are mainly principles, iii) 
where there is a combination of both.”80
74  See J Black, „Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation“ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Papers 13/2008 (2008) at page 12
75  ibid
76  ibid at page 17
77  See also I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (1992) Oxford University Press 
78 See R Baldwin, Rules and Government (1995) Oxford : Clarendon Press
79  J Black, „Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation“ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
13/2008 (2008) at page 19; She argues that “in a regime with a tough, punitive approach in which every infraction is 
met with a sanction, principles based regulation (PBR) would not survive – this being the case, because there is 
greater risk that firms will make the wrong assessment ie one with which the regulator does not agree.” Under 
principles based regulation, she argues further, “firms are required to think through the application of the provisions 
to particular situations to a far greater degree than they are with respect to a detailed rule – hence the higher 
probability that firms would make the wrong assessment .” See ibid at page 18
80  J Black, „Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation“ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
13/2008 (2008) at page 19; It is further argued that “Different rule types make it easier for regulatory officials to 
Having considered the forms, attributes and benefits of principles based regulation, the weaknesses 
inherent in this type of regulation are worth mentioning. Firstly, in relation to the all important aim 
of  ensuring  accountability  –  which  should  be  fostered  if  adequate  monitoring  procedures  are 
observed and carried out by the responsible levels of authority. Principles based regulation could 
serve as a hindrance towards ensuring accountability. In this respect, reference will be made to the 
seven paradoxes of principles based regulation – which are as follows:81
- “i) The interpretative paradox : Different interpretations attributed to principles could result in 
imprecise  and  general  terms  being  accorded  very  specific  interpretations  –  even  though 
principles are supposed to offer flexibility (where these are characterised by imprecise terms).
- ii)  The  communicative  paradox:  Principles,  whilst  facilitating  communication,  could  also 
hinder such communication. The paradox is attributed to the distinction between legal use of 
language and its ordinary use. 
- iii) The compliance paradox: Principles provide scope for flexibility in compliance – however 
this could result in conservative and/or uniform behaviour by regulated firms.
- iv) The supervisory and enforcement paradox: Principles require enforcement to provide them 
with credibility – however over-enforcement could result in their demise.
- v) The internal  management paradox:  Principles based regulation has the potential  to offer 
required flexibility for internal control systems to develop – and also the potential to overload 
them.
- vi) Ethical paradox
- vii) Trust paradox
A detailed consideration of the above mentioned paradoxes highlights the importance of having a 
clear understanding of the form of principles based regulation which is applicable to a particular 
bank or business. As highlighted under the substantive principles based regulation, “those who 
know what they are meant to be doing and are generally inclined to do it ( the well intentioned and 
well informed), are best dealt with using a negotiating strategy.” Hence a more draconian mode of 
enforcement , that is tougher sanctions, would not be best suited in facilitating compliance by such 
groups  –  such  sanctions  being  better  reserved  for  the  “ill  informed  and  ill  intentioned.” 
Furthermore, a tough punitive regime is one in which principles are unlikely to survive – even 
though detailed rules could still be implemented under principles based regulation.82
Hence the desired level of compliance required within a firm is best achieved having regard to the 
organisational structure which exists within an organisation – and to whether (as a result of a such 
determination), that organisation could be considered a suitable candidate for the application of 
principles  based  regulation.  Clear  delegation  and  segregation  of  duties  within  an  organisation 
would not only promote accountability, but would also facilitate a system where principles could be 
applied and also facilitate monitoring procedures. Consequently, monitoring would also facilitate 
accountability  –  since  frequent  reviews  and  discussions  between  management  and  appropriate 
personnel  should increase an understanding of  the activities  carried out  by particular  divisions 
within the organisation.
deal with certain types of regulated firms.”
81   See ibid at pages 25 -35
82   Refer to Formal Principles Based Regulation; ibid at page 12
H. CONCLUSION
Monitoring fosters transparency, which in turn fosters accountability. Monitoring of key risks, as 
well as periodic evaluations by the business lines and internal audit constitute a vital element of 
corporate  governance  – hence  the  overall  effectiveness  of  a  bank’s  internal  controls  should  be 
monitored on an ongoing and frequent83 basis.84 
Since  it  is  possible  for  detailed  rules  to  operate  under  principles  based  regulation  – and since 
detailed  rules  constitute  a  vital  element  in  ensuring  that  clear  delegation  and  segregation  of 
responsibilities exist within an organisation, it could be said that the level of accountability derived 
under principles based regulation is dependent on the form of principles based regulation. Under the 
formal principles based regulation, the level of accountability derived is likely to be greater than 
that derived under full principles based regulation. As highlighted within the relevant sections of 
this paper, an approach which combines negotiating and punitive strategies is always considered 
best – owing to the level of flexibility offered by such an approach. However the organisational 
structure, culture and several other factors require consideration before substantive principles based 
regulation is judged to be the optimal approach.
In accordance with Principle 13 of the Principles for the Assessment of Internal Control Systems, 
“supervisors should require that all banks, regardless of size, have an effective system of internal 
controls that is consistent with the nature, complexity, and risk inherent in their on- and- off balance 
sheet activities and that corresponds to the bank’s environment and conditions.” Furthermore, “in 
those instances where supervisors determine that a bank’s internal control system is not adequate or 
effective for that bank’s specific risk profile, they should take appropriate action.”  In accordance 
with  Core  Principle  17  of  the  Basel  Core  Principles  for  Effective  Bank  Supervision,  Internal  
controls and audit, specific attention should given to ensure the existence of: i )“clear arrangements 
for delegating authority and responsibility; (ii)separation of the functions that involve committing 
the bank, paying away its funds, and accounting for its assets and liabilities.”
Where  clear  delegation  of  authority,  segregation  of  responsibilities  are  not  in  place,  the  most 
appropriate and obvious action might be to initiate a more deterrence based approach – rather than a 
negotiative based approach. However, reference must be made to factors highlighted under the first 
paragraph of this conclusive section.
Increased formalisation under principles based regulation would still allow for a consideration of 
the  substance  of  transactions  – whilst  allowing for  flexibility  in  terms  of  its  application.  With 
regards to its application, this implies its suitability as the appropriate mode of regulation - based on 
the  level  of  accountability  it  could  provide  an  organisation  with  and whether  an  organisation, 
because of its structure and culture, should consider applying it at all.
83  “The frequency of monitoring different activities of a bank should be determined by considering the risks involved 
and the frequency and nature of changes occurring in the operating environment.” See Framework for Internal 
Control Systems  in Banking Organisations at page 20 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs40.pdf
84  See also Principle 10 of the Principles for the Assessment of Internal Control Systems; Framework for Internal 
Control Systems  in Banking Organisations at page 20 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs40.pdf. “Monitoring the 
effectiveness of internal controls could be undertaken by personnel from several different areas, including the 
business function itself, financial control and internal audit. For that reason, it is important that senior management 
clarify which personnel are responsible for which monitoring functions.” Further, “monitoring should constitute part 
of the daily activities of the bank – whilst including separate periodic evaluations of the overall internal control 
process. ”;ibid
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